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DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL
The proceedings of grand juries have tradi-
tionally been enshrouded with secrecy,' at least
I Until 1946 disclosure of grand jury materials was
controlled by the common law. 48 VA. L. REv. 959
(1962). There was reluctance to grant disclosure to
any party outside of the Department of Justice. See
United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
In some courts judicial "reluctance" bordered upon
adamant refusal:
Finally, the defendants ... move for inspection
of the grand jury's minutes.... It is said to lie
in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no judge
of this court has granted it, and I hope none
ever will. Under our criminal procedure the
accused has every advantage .... Why in addi-
tion he should in advance have the whole evi-
dence against him to pick over at his leisure,
and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) (Learned Hand, J.). The liberal discovery pol-
icy of the Federal Rules did much to dissolve this
unbending attitude against discovery of grand jury
materials. Comment, Grand Jury Minutes and the Rule
of Secrecy in Federal Litigation, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 482
(1960). The Supreme Court recognized in 1940 that
"after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclo-
sure is wholly proper where the ends of justice
require it," United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). Still, "[t]ime after time in
criminal cases courts.., denied defendants' motions
to examine grand jury transcripts pending trial."
United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D.
486, 487 (D. Del. 1954). One case held that access
must be denied absent "overwhelming public inter-
est" in disclosure. United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 279, 281 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
Whether disclosure of grand jury materials to civil
litigants was ever permissible remained in doubt until
the decision in United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343 (1958). Very few cases
prior to Procter & Gamble had dealt with motions for
disclosure from civil defendants. See United States v.
Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J.
1955) (access granted); United States v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486 (D. Del. 1954) (access
denied). That access to grand jury materials could be
permitted for non-administrative civil plaintiffs was
first acknowledged in City of Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa.
1962). Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1133 (1964).
The doctrine of grand jury secrecy has recently
been the subject of many critical articles. See, e.g.,
Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 18 (1967); Knudsen, Pretrial
Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH.
in American jurisdictions. 2 While much has
been written concerning the right of criminal
defendants regarding access to grand jury ma-
terials, 3 this comment will examine the growing
trend among the federal courts to allow expo-
sure of grand jury proceedings for purposes
other than the prosecution or defense of the
main criminal action. To what degree and
under what circumstances the federal policy in
favor of liberal discovery in civil actions4 should
outweigh objections to allowing civil litigants
access to information gathered under the broad
inquisitorial powers of the grand jury5 will be
L. REv. 423 (1973); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The
Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668
(1962). Most of the articles criticizing grand jury
secrecy concentrate on the deleterious effect of the
doctrine on the defense of an indicted defendant's
criminal trial.
2 The grand jury was not necessarily secret in its
origin in England. Comment, Federal Grand Jury
Secrecy, 5 GoNz. L. REv. 255 (1970). It was not until
1681 that grand jurors were found to have the right
to hear testimony in private. The decision settling
this right was the Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How.
St. Tr. 759 (1681). For the purposes of this paper,
the most relevant aspect of the English doctrine of
secrecy of grand jury proceedings is that its aim was
primarily to protect the accused from the Crown,
rather than to protect witnesses coming before it.
Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J.
MAR. J. PPAC. & PRO. 18 (1967). This purpose is in
sharp contrast, both to the traditional American
reasons for the rule of secrecy, and to the effect of
the doctrine here, which is to strengthen the Govern-
ment's case against a defendant.
3 See 66 DICK. L. REv. 379 (1962); 38 FORDHAM L.
REV. 307 (1969); 81 HAWAH L. REv. 712 (1968); 62
Nw. U.L. REV. 233 (1967); 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 382.
4 Associated Metal & Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Geert
Howaldt, 348 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1965); June v. George
C. Peterson Co., 155 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1946). See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
5 The investigative and inquisitorial powers of a
federal grand jury are great. The duty of subpoenaed
witnesses to appear and testify before the grand jury
was recognized in the First Judiciary Act. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88. The only
restrictions on the grand jury's right to "every man's
evidence" is that the evidence be relevant and mate-
rial. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 6
(D.D.C. 1973). Witnesses need not be informed of
the nature of the offense being investigated before
being called to testify. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
65 (1906). Witnesses may not object to the jurisdiction
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examined. Constitutionally and statutorily
based criticism of the manner in which some
litigants gain access to grand jury materials will
be evaluated. In addition, this comment will
place considerable erphasis on the degree to
which the reasons behind the grand jury se-
crecy rule are satisfied by the application of
the current standards for disclosure requests.
The purposes for grand jury secrecy in
American jurisdictions were set out in United
States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp. :6 1) to
prevent the escape of suspects before indict-
ment can be accomplished; 2) to protect the
freedom of grand jury deliberations; 3) to pre-
vent tampering with grand jury witnesses be-
fore their testimony is given at public trial; 4)
to encourage unrestrained disclosures by grand
jury witnesses, with no fear of retaliation; and
5) to protect a suspect found innocent by the
grand jury.7 Federal courts since the Amazon
of a grand jury over the subject matter under inves-
tigation. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919). Testimony can be compelled through the
grant of use immunity, despite a claim of fifth
amendment privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 462 (1972). One may not refuse to answer
questions on the ground that they are based on
evidence taken in violation of fourth amendment
rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974). There is no right to counsel in the grand jury
room. Gallaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 523
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). Further-
more, a grand jury indictment may not be challenged
at trial although based on hearsay, Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956), or on evidence taken
in violation of an accused's right against self-incrimi-
nation. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349
(1958). In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
343 (1974), the Court stated:
The grand jury may compel production of evi-
dence or the testimony of witnesses as it consid-
ers appropriate, and its operation generally is
unrestrained by the technical procedural and
evidentiary rules governing the conduct of crim-
inal trials.
6 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931).
For the purposes of this paper, only the fourth
reason-the encouragement of unrestricted testi-
mony by grand jury witnesses-is of much import
since disclosure of grand jury materials to civil liti-
gants is generally requested following the completion
of the main criminal litigation. The first, second and
fifth bases of grand jury secrecy are no longer appli-
cable once an indictment has been returned, the
accused is in custody, and the grand jury is dismissed.
The third basis is not relevant once the criminal trial
has ended. The fourth basis, however, is considered
applicable to a subsequent civil proceeding. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth reason to
decision have recognized, more or less, these
same bases of the grand jury secrecy rule.8 In
general the case law concerning whether grand
jury material may be disclosed to litigants and,
indeed, the reasons for secrecy themselves
show a primary concern with the continued
viability of the grand jury itself as an investiga-
tive body free from extraneous pressures.9
Pressures to which a grand jury may be exposed
include not only the fear of retaliation in grand
juror and grand jury witness alike, but also
unnecessary control by any person or group
over the direction a grand jury investigation
may take. In order for the grand jury to
function independently, it should ideally be
free from the proddings of the judiciary, the
executive, the numerous civil agencies and
public opinion.
The rule of grand jury secrecy forbids only
the disclosure of grand jury "materials." "Ma-
terials" include not only the transcript of pro-
ceedings, but also information concerning the-
identity of persons called to testify10 and doc-
uments subpoenaed. In addition, "materials"
subject to the secrecy rule may consist of sent-
encing memoranda prepared by the Govern-
ment 2 or summaries of testimony prepared by
include the encouragement of future grand jury wit-
nesses to testify freely. In United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958), the Court
stated that: "[t]he grand jury as a public institution
serving the community might suffer if those testifying
today knew that the secrecy of their testimony would
be lifted tomorrow." Therefore, district courts in
deciding requests for disclosure often make inquiry
into the effect of present disclosure on the freedom
of grand jury witnesses to testify in the future, a
speculative inquiry at best. One may also question
whether the average grand jury witness expects his
testimony to remain secret. See text accompanying
note 82 infra.
8 See U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District
Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d
Cir. 1954); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F.
Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
9 Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1964).
10 Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44
F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Application of Califor-
nia, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
n Krause v. Rhodes, 390 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D.
Ohio 1975); Corona Construction Co. v. Ampress
Brick Co., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
12 ABC Great Stores, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 309
F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Hancock Brothers,
Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968);
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court,
345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965).
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the defense 3 if these reports contain grand
jury information. Documents subpoenaed by a
grand jury are not subject to the rule of secrecy
if independently discovered by a civil litigant.
1 4
A federal statute' 5 ostensibly covers the mat-
ter of disclosure of grand jury material. 16 The
statute is uncomplicated. According to Rule
6(e), disclosure can be made to any "attorneys
for the government." In addition disclosure
can be made at a trial court's direction when
"preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding." Three fairly recent Supreme
Court decisions have dealt with the question of
when a trial judge may order disclosure. In
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 17 the Court
13 Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Philadelphia Electric Co.
v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
14 Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. First Minnesota
Construction Co., 405 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1975);
Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
This exception to the rule of grand jury secrecy is
applicable where a discovering party identifies docu-
ments that happened to be before the grand jury at
some point in time, in contrast to a general request
for all documents examined by the grand jury. The
rationale for this exception is that the documents are
being sought "for their own intrinsic value" rather
than to learn "what transpired before the grand
jury." 405 F. Supp. at 931.
15 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in part:
(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Dis-
closure of matters occurring before the grand
jury other than its deliberations and the vote of
any juror may be made to the attorneys for the
government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter,
stenographer, operator of a recording device,
or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony
may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court prelimi-
narily to or in connection with ajudicial proceed-
ing or when permitted by the court at the request
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand
jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed
upon any person except in accordance with this
rule.
" The federal courts have tempered the terms of
the statute by limiting, in some situations covered by
the statute, the circumstances in which disclosure
may be granted, see text accompanying note 17 infra,
and by permitting disclosure in some circumstances
not contemplated by the statute. See In re Biaggi, 478
F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
17 356 U.S. 677 (1958). Procter & Gamble, the
defendant in a civil antitrust suit, argued that since
the Government had free access to the grand jury
transcript, the defendant should, too. The company
established that although the power of a trial
judge to order disclosure of grand jury material
is discretionary, the discretion may be exercised
only where the party seeking disclosure can
show "particularized need."' In Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States,19 it was held that
"[lthe burden ... is on the defense to show
that 'a particularized need' exists for the min-
utes which outweighs the policy of secrecy."
20
The most recent Supreme Court decision on
the subject, Dennis v. United States,21 evidenced
approval of the trend toward more liberal dis-
covery rules in the criminal area. 2? Dennis also
indicated that disclosure of grand jury material
questions would be decided on a case by case
basis, with inquiry into the particular facts
giving rise to a need for disclosure. 23 This
trilogy of Supreme Court decisions can be read
as significantly relaxing the doctrine of grand
jury secrecy, judicial response to disclosure
requests having advanced from outright re-
fusal, or application of an "ends of justice" test
in the pre-Pittsburgh Plate cases2 to a standard
also contended that only the "good cause" standard
of FED. R. Civ. P. 34 need be shown in a civil suit.
Both arguments failed in the Supreme Court.
"I1d. at 683. "Particularized need" has not been
defined by the Court. However, it is clear that an
articulated, non-frivolous need for grand jury mate-
rials is, at the least, expected. General helpfulness in
preparing one's case for trial is not sufficient to
constitute "particularized need." City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486,
489 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
19 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
2 0 Id. at 400. The defendant in this criminal prose-
cution did not attempt to show particularized need
for the grand jury minutes requested, but asserted a
right to the material based upon the Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
21 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
22 These [case law] developments are entirely
consonant with the growing realization that dis-
closure, rather than suppression, of relevant
materials ordinarily promotes the proper admin-
istration of criminal justice.
Id. at 870.
2 The facts found sufficient in Dennis for disclo-
sure of grand jury testimony of certain prosecution
witnesses were: 1) the trial testimony of the witnesses
would postdate their grand jury testimony by 15
years; 2) the witnesses were key to the case; 3) their
testimony was largely uncorroborated; 4) the wit-
nesses were not impartial observers and, thus, their
testimony was suspect. On the other hand, it was
observed that none of the reasons behind the policy
of grand jury secrecy, as articulated in the Amazon
case, was applicable. Id. at 872-73, n. 18.
24 See cases cited note 1, supra.
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in which the articulated need of the litigant for
materials is balanced against the reasons for
grand jury secrecy still applicable in the partic-
ular case.
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Rule 6(e) provides that disclosure can be
made to "attorneys for the government" with-
out an order from the district court. The cases
are now consistent in holding that "attorneys
for the government" includes only federal offi-
cials.2 These federal officials may have access
to grand jury material in subsequent civil ac-
tions also,26 with some restrictions. The major
restriction is that the Government cannot use
the grand jury process in order to make out a
civil caseY.2 The caselaw concerning when the
grand jury system is abused varies. It has been
held that the investigation must have been "in
[its] inception exclusively criminal .''2 Another
court found that there would be no misuse of
the grand jury system if at the time of the
investigation the Justice Department had an
"open mind as to what the appropriate remedy
should be, civil, criminal, or both," but there
would be an abuse if the Justice Department
had only the barest expectation of prosecuting
an indictment.2 9 Although the Supreme Court
has said that the fact that a grand jury returned
I See, e.g., United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp.
581 (S.D. Ill. 1961), denying the status to a state
attorney general. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(c),
which states:
" 'Attorney for the government' means the Attor-
ney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney
General, a United States Attorney, an authorized
assistant of a United States Attorney... "
26 The Supreme Court in United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), implicitly ac-
knowledged use of grand jury transcripts by the
United States in its civil antitrust suit, despite the
disadvantage to the defendant. In United States v.
General Electric Co., 209 F. Supp. 197, 201 (E.D. Pa.
1962), it was reasoned that the work of the Justice
Department is not limited to the bringing of criminal
prosecutions. Also, the court likened the institution
of government civil antitrust suits to a prosecution,
in that the goal is correction rather than remedy. Id.
at 202.
27 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F.
Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960).
28 United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Thus, where theJustice Department
applied for a 6(e) order to investigate whether there
had been civil or criminal violations of Title 26,
United States Code, the order was denied.
29 187 F. Supp. at 57.
no indictment against a person under investi-
gation is not evidence of the Government's lack
of integrity, 0 the fact that an indictment was
returned is sufficient to show good faith.2 ' In
addition to the restriction that the Government
not abuse the grand jury process to obtain
evidence for civil litigation, a court may place
certain procedural requirements on the use of
the grand jury transcript in a civil case in an
attempt to minimize the defendant's disadvan-
tage 32
A state law enforcement official seeking dis-
closure of grand jury minutes logically falls
within the second sentence of Rule 6(e), that is,
he must show particularized need preliminary
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.-
At least one Supreme Court Justice has recently
imposed a particularized need standard on a
request for disclosure from a state prosecutor.3
However, other courts have been more lenient
with the disclosure requests of state enforce-
ment officials, seeming to require only a show-
ing of "good cause" as opposed to particular-
ized need. 5 This preference for the Rule 6(e)
20 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
21 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F.
Supp. 250 (D. Minn. 1962), affd, 382 U.S. 44 (1965).
2 In United States v. Max Factor & Co., 39 F.R.D.
3 (W.D. Mo. 1966), the court restricted the use of
grand jury testimony by the Government while de-
posing its own and the defendant's witnesses by
ordering the Government to 1) announce that it
would use the prior testimony, and 2) show the
witness a copy of it, allowing him time to read it
before deposing him.
13 See Petition of Brooke, 229 F. Supp. 377 (D.
Mass. 1964), where the Attorney General of Massa-
chusetts sought disclosure of grand jury minutes for
use in both an on-going civil suit by the Common-
wealth, and to obtain criminal indictments; Applica-
tion of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961),
where California, private utilities and municipalities
bringing a civil antitrust action were denied disclo-
sure of grand jury subpoenaes upon a showing of
mere economic and time savings.
3 Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice, 1975). The petitioner argued that
obtaining the grand jury material would save the
state investigatory expenses and would be useful in
refreshing witnesses' memories when they testified
before the state grand jury. Justice Douglas found it
"doubtful" that particularized need was made out.
Id. at 1304. Another factor indicating need-that the
statute of limitations would soon run out on the
offense suspected-was rejected as under the prose-
cutor's control.
22 See United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581
(S.D. Ill. 1961), where the court implied that the
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motions of state prosecutors may be explained
by their desire to encourage the public's interest
in justice.36 If the major thrust of Rule 6(e) is
to foster the enforcement offederal statutes by
allowing free access to grand jury transcripts to
particular persons, 37 that aim is not satisfied by
applying lenient disclosure rules to requests
from state prosecutors enforcing state laws.
38
However, upon consideration of the Amazon
reasons for grand jury secrecy, it would appear
that disclosing materials to a state prosecutor
conducting a subsequent criminal inquiry does
not harm the integrity of the grand jury as an
institution. All but the fourth reason, the en-
couragement of free disclosure, are inapplica-
ble to the situation. Grand jury witnesses ex-
pect, if anything, that the evidence they give
will be used by a prosecutor to build a criminal
case; there should be little intimidation from
the knowledge that the prosecutor works at a
state level. More importantly, it is improbable
that a state prosecutor could control the direc-
tion of a federal grand jury investigation for
his own purposes; independence of the grand
jury is not threatened by the disclosure.
state attorney general could obtain disclosure of
federal grand jury minutes upon a showing that an
offense had been committed under Illinois laws, that
showing satisfying the particularized need require-
ment; In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 184
F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960), where the state prose-
cutor was found to have established particularized
need where he anticipated the use of grand jury
materials to save him time and effort, to determine
which persons to call as witnesses before the state
grand jury and to serve general discovery purposes.
Two restrictions were placed upon the prosecutor.
He was to wait for termination of the federal pro-
ceeding before obtaining the material. "Protection of
the witnesses-a constituent of the rule of grand jury
secrecy-dictates this course." Id. at 41. The prose-
cutor was also to limit the use of grand jury materials
to development of leads; he was not to use the
materials as evidence at trial.
36 "[A]fter the grand jury's functions are ended,
disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice
require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
37 See United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F.
Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
38 On the other hand, private civil litigants, e.g. in
the antitrust field, may have a significant part in
enforcing federal statutes. Yet the particularized
need standard is applied to them. See text accompa-
nying notes 67-69, supra.
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS BY AD-
MINISTRATIVE BODIES
Administrative agencies generally seek access
to grand jury materials in one of two ways: the
agency may request disclosure in connection
with its own proceedings, or it may seek disclo-
sure as an investigatory aide of the United
States Attorney, i.e., in connection with the
criminal proceedings. A federal agency does
not come within the first sentence of Rule
6(e);3 9 therefore, it must show particularized
need in order to gain disclosure. This is true
even though the agency is joined with the
Government as co-plaintiff40 or the agency is
represented by an attorney in the Justice De-
partment.
4 1
A common objection to a request by an
administrative body for use of grand jury ma-
terials in its own right has been that the disclo-
sure is not "preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding" per Rule 6(e) .42 In
39 1n re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (SEC); Capitol Indemnity Corp. v.
First Minnesota Construction Co., 405 F. Supp. 929
(D. Mass. 1975) (HUD); United States v. General
Electric Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (TVA);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) (FTC).
4' United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F.
Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The United States was
allowed free access to grand jury materials, but co-
plaintiff Tennessee Valley Authority was not. The
holding that TVA would not be permitted access
would seem to be applicable to all federal agencies
even though "the TVA is a quasi-governmental cor-
poration and is not really an administrative agency at
all." In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
41 In Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. First Minnesota
Construction Co., 405 F. Supp. at 934 (D. Mass.
1975), an assistant U.S. Attorney representing
H.U.D. sought disclosure of grand jury materials
while the grand jury was still in session:
Permitting an administrative agency access to
grand jury material while the grand jury is still
conducting its investigation creates a number of
potential problems among them being erosion
of congressional limitation on agency powers,
the possible chilling effect on potential witnesses
and undue agency influence on the course of
grand jury inquiry.
The court denied that the U.S. Attorney himself
could use grand jury materials to prepare a civil case
while the grand jury was still investigating.
42 See In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 184
F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960), where a city was denied
disclosure of grand jury evidence to be used in an
administrative hearing; United States v. Crolich, 101
F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Ala. 1952), where the Government
moved for disclosure to the county election board.
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1958 an influential opinion by Judge Learned
Hand defined 'judicial proceeding" liberally,
so that many administrative hearings might fit
within the second sentence of Rule 6(e).41 Prac-
tically any administrative hearing is preliminary
to a judicial proceeding in the sense that a
court might be called upon to review some
aspect of the hearing. Therefore, the objection
has not succeeded in preventing administrative
bodies from gaining access to grand jury mate-
rials .44
A second method by which administrative
access to grand jury materials is gained is
through providing technical assistance to the
Government in preparing a grand jury case.
The assistance of professional administrative
personnel may be necessary in preparing highly
complex cases, e.g., tax evasion cases. 45 How-
ever, the subsequent use of knowledge gleaned
from grand jury materials in a civil administra-
tive hearing smacks of abuse of the grand jury
processes.
11 [W]e hold that, prima facie, the term "judicial
proceeding" includes any proceeding determin-
able by a court, having its object the compliance
of any person, subject to judicial control, with
standards imposed upon his conduct in the pub-
lic interest, even though such compliance is en-
forced without the procedure applicable to the
punishment of crime.
Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958).
A United States Attorney had obtained an order
directing him to disclose grand jury minutes to the
Grievance Committee of the New York City Bar
Association. The court found the disclosure to be
preliminary to a proceeding before the New York
Appellate Division to discipline a member of the bar.
41 Disclosure has been granted to participants in a
proceeding for revocation of a beer permit upon an
"ends of justice" criterion, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933), and to those
conducting a police disciplinary hearing, found to be
preliminary to a judicial proceeding under Judge
Hand's test, In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury
v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973).
41 As the court in In re William H. Pflaumer &
Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971), pointed
out, the Justice Department does not typically employ
its own personnel for technical analysis:
Even though investigative agents are assigned
by the various agencies to assist the government's
attorneys, they are never assigned in a capacity
which separates them operationally from their
agencies. No matter what agency they work for,
they are required to submit reports to their
agencies and are subject to supervision within
each particular agency. Apparently, this is a
constant practice throughout the federal law
enforcement system.
Id. at 475.
It is clear that a grand jury investigation
cannot be instituted solely for the purpose of
making an inquiry into civil matters. 46 Access
by administrative personnel has been denied
where the investigation had an admittedly dual
civil and criminal interest." However, it may
be difficult to uncover the basic purpose of a
grand jury inquiry. Some courts have examined
the history of administrative interest in the
person(s) under scrutiny by the grand jury to
determine if abuse of the system was
indicated.48 Upon a granting of a motion to
disclose grand jury materials to administrative
agency personnel, the court order usually con-
tains a requirement that the material remain
under the "aegis" of the Government. 49 But
"aegis" is a murky concept.5 0 Some measure of
control over the grand jury materials is to be
retained by the prosecution, but the amount of
control is unclear. For example, that the grand
jury material has been moved physically to the
offices of an agency does not, in itself, indicate
lack of control by the Government."i As long
as agency access to grand jury materials is
gained through a bona fide prosecution, and
the materials remain under the "aegis" of the
prosecution, a majority of courts sees no barrier
to subsequent use of that information in an
administrative civil suit.
5 2
4 6Inre Kadish, 377 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Il1. 1974).
" United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1s In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 998 (1957). At
the request of the Treasury Department, which had
begun its own investigation, the Justice Department
called a grand jury to investigate the tax returns of
petitioners. Treasury officials aided the grand jury
investigation. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
any future civil use of the information by the Treas-
ury Department would violate the petitioners' fourth
and fifth amendment rights. But see In re William G.
Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa.
1971), where a protective order against I.R.S. access
to grand jury materials was denied even though the
agency had previously been investigating the peti-
tioner and dropped that inquiry to participate in the
criminal investigation.
41 See In re July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. .Supp.
1334 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re William H. Pflaumer &
Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
11 Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal
Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
51 Id.
52 See In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Although the United
States Attorney admitted that civil use of the materi-
als might follow, the court denied an application for
a protective order against the I.R.S. reasoning that,
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Access to grand jury materials through the
status of an investigative or technical aide to
the Government has been granted to personnel
of the Internal Revenue Service,5 3 Securities
and Exchange Commission, 54 the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the Treasury
Department55 and the Post Office.56 Though
these agencies would have to demonstrate par-
ticularized need in order to gain access to
grand jury materials in connection with their
own civil proceedings, by aiding in the presen-
tation of evidence to a grand jury, the agencies
can avoid having to make such a showing.
An article57 published in 1975, which has
already influenced decisions in this area,5" dis-
cussed several objections to allowing agency
access to grand jury material through this "back
door" method. First, the primary and only
work of the grand jury is to accuse individuals
"the mere fact that the government contemplates
possible use of the subpoenaed material in a possible
future civil proceeding is no grounds for a protective
order." Id. at 472.
Employment of grand jury evidence in a concur-
rent civil administrative trial has been approved by
at least one court. In re Kadish, 377 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. I11. 1974). The taxpayer moved to quash a
grand jury subpoena for his records on the theory
that the evidence gained would be used to establish
civil liability.
It is well established that a grand jury may not
be utilized solely for the purpose of making an
investigation of civil matters.... However, this
does not preclude the government from using
this evidence, legitimately developed by the
grand jury, in concurrent or future civil pro-
ceedings.
Id. at 952. Contra, Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. First
Minnesota Construction Co., 405 F. Supp. 929 (D.
Mass. 1975) (court questioned concurrent use of
grand jury materials by the Justice Department in a
civil matter).
0 See Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119 (9th
Cir. 1976); In re July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp.
1334 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
5' See United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106
(E.D. La. 1970).
" United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.
1976).
56 United States v. Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D.
Md. 1963).
57 Note, Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury
Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 162 (1975).
s See, e.g. In re Grandburg, Simplot Co. v. United
States District Court 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,195,
86,197 (9th Cir. 1976); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v.
Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098
note 7 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Both cases dwelled consider-
ably on the criticisms of administrative access to
grand jury materials presented in Note, supra note
57.
of crimes. It is contrary to that sole purpose to
involve the grand jury in the investigation of
civil liability. Nor should the grand jury be
subjected to any control by an administrative
agency. Second, Congress has established the
proper scope of administrative investigative
powers under the Administrative Procedure
Act and other statutes. To permit these safe-
guards59 to be avoided through resort to the
wider-reaching powers60 of the grand jury is
an abuse of the criminal process.
Two court opinions have responded to this
criticism in a significant way. In Robert Haw-
thorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 61 new
procedural requirements in connection with
Rule 6(e) orders were announced. These re-
quirements were aimed at ensuring that grand
jury materials remain under the control of the
Justice Department.62 In J. R. Simplot Co. v.
United States District Court,6 3 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Government must show particu-
larized and compelling need before administra-
59 Under the Administrative Procedure Act wit-
nesses are afforded measures of protection not avail-
able to grand jury witnesses. They may be repre-
sented by counsel while testifying. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b)
(1970). Testimony must be recorded, and a transcript
supplied to every witness. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (c) (1970).
Additional limitations are placed on individual agen-
cies by statute. For example, an I.R.S. subpoena
must be relevant or material to the inquiry in prog-
ress. I.R.C. § 7 602 (1970). No taxpayer can be
subjected to unnecessary investigation. I.R.C. § 7
605 (b) (1970).
6 See note 5, supra.
61 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The court
suggested that the Justice Department, when bring-
ing I.R.S. aides into the investigation, require an
oath of secrecy concerning the grand jury materials'
contents, prepare comprehensive written instructions
on the use of the material, and ensure that grand
jury material be kept separate from other I.R.S.
papers.
In addition, the Justice Department was ordered
to keep a record of 1) a general description of the
investigation; 2) the persons being investigated; 3)
the administrative personnel having access to the
material; 4) the supervisory personnel of the agency
involved in the investigation; 5) the supervisory per-
sonnel of the Justice Department involved, and 6)
dates on which the material was received, consulted,
and use terminated by the agency.
62 "These devices should help insure that the rec-
ords will not be utilized by the agency in any inde-
pendent sense; concomitantly, they underscore and
infuse meaning into the "aegis" concept." Id. at 1128.
6 [1977] TAX CAS. (CCH) 86,195 (9th Cir. 1976).
The I.R.S. had been investigating Simplot for several
years prior to the grand jury inquiry. Simplot ap-
pealed the granting of a 6(e) order to disclose grand
jury material to I.R.S. personnel.
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tive access to grand jury materials will be or-
dered, 64 and that a district court granting access
would retain "close supervision" over the infor-
mation in an attempt to prevent civil use of the
materials. 65 The court also indicated that the
remedy for civil use of information obtained
through aiding a grand jury investigation
would be suppression of that evidence at the
civil trial.
66
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS BY
INDIVIDUAL CIVIL LITIGANTS
In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 67 the
Supreme Court established that disclosure
would be granted to individual litigants only
upon a showing of particularized need. The
Court did enumerate, however, several uses to
which grand jury materials could be put at trial
which would qualify as particularized need,"
indicating that disclosure would be warranted
if this need outweighed the policy in favor of
grand jury secrecy .69
Civil litigants, in particular those involved in
treble damage antitrust suits, would often
benefit greatly by examination of grand jury
61 The Government must show the necessity for
each particular person's aid rather than showing
merely a general necessity for assistance, expert
or otherwise. Moreover, absent an explanation
for the failure to use qualified personnel within
the Justice Department, the Government cannot
carry its burden ....
Id. at 86,198.
5 Id.
6' Two requirements, however, are so basic to
the preservation of values served by grand jury
secrecy that they should be explicitly stated: (1)
on appropriate request, the agency must identify
the source of its information in a civil case that
was preceded by a grand jury investigation in
which its personnel were used to assist the pros-
ecutor in presenting a case to the grand jury;
and (2) upon a motion to suppress in the civil
proceeding, the agency bears the burden of
proving an independent source for the informa-
tion.
Id. at 86,199. See also United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 175 F. Supp. 198 (D.N.J. 1959),
where the remedy employed for improper use
of grand jury processes was to grant equal access
to the materials to the defendant.
67 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
1 We do not reach in this case problems concern-
ing the use of the grand jury transcript at the
trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollec-
tion, to test his credibility and the like. Those
are cases of particularized need where the se-
crecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and
limitedly.
Id. at 683.
69 Id. at 682.
minutes. At question in their motions for dis-
closure under Rule 6(e) is what minimal degree
of need must be demonstrated, especially in
those circumstances in which the traditional
reasons for the rule of secrecy of grand jury
proceedings70 are no longer applicable. There
is some indication that federal courts are turn-
ing away from the somewhat nebulous 71 stan-
dard presented in Procter & Gamble. At least
one circuit court of appeals has discarded alto-
gether the requirement that a ciminal defend-
ant show need before disclosure of grand jury
materials can be granted.72 In civil litigation,
some requests for disclosure have been met
with a modified Procter & Gamble balancing
test. 73 Rather than determining if a particular-
ized need outweighs the policy in favor of
secrecy, the inquiry has been whether any rea-
sons behind the policy of secrecy outweigh the
petitioner's need. 74 A slight need, e.g., use for
discovery leads, has sufficed where the policy
reasons in favor of grand jury secrecy were
unsubstantial. 75 It appears that equitable no-
tions of fair play have influenced decisions in
disclosure.
The first76 federal decision allowing civil
plaintiffs limited disclosure of a civil defend-
ant's grand jury minutes for deposition pur-
poses employed two justifications for the inva-
70 See text accompanying note 3 infra.
71 At various points in the opinion the Court
seemed to require either a proof of "particularized
need," "compelling necessity" or that "without [dis-
closure] a defense would be greatly prejudiced or
... an injustice would be done." 356 U.S. at 682.
72 United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1967). The Second Circuit interpreted Procter &
Gamble and Pittsburgh Plate to establish merely "a
minimum standard to which the courts must adhere"
rather than to require a particular showing before
disclosure could be made. Id. at 369.
73 "There are instances when that need will out-
weigh the countervailing policy." Procter & Gamble,
356 U.S. at 682.
74 See United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F.
Supp. 759 (W.D. Mich. 1966), where the court saw
the major issue to be "whether or not defendant's
proposed order on disclosure might tend to inhibit
future grand jury testimony." Id. at 765.
7' [I]f the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not
apply at all in a given situation, or apply only to
an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclo-
sure should not be required to demonstrate a
large compelling need.
U.S. Industries v. United States District Court, 345
F.2d 18, 21 (9th Cir. 1965).76 See Note, Release of Grand Jury Minutes, in the
National Deposition Program of the Electrical Equipment
Cases, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1964).
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sion of the secrecy rule.7 7 The justifications
were the unique nature of the nation-wide
deposition program involved, 7  and the fact
that some plaintiffs were agencies charged with
protecting the public's interest. In addition
disclosure was to be minimal. Grand jury se-
crecy was to be safeguarded by the use of in
camera inspection for inconsistencies in grand
jury testimony of each individual deponent.
A trend toward freer use of grand jury
testimony in deposition taking is appearing. It
has been held not to be necessary to show
inconsistency between the two testimonies in
order to establish particularized cause. Where
a fair amount of time has elapsed between the
two statements,79 where the deponent's mem-
ory proves dim,80 or where deponents are not
subject to service of process,"" a court might
find particularized cause for producing grand
jury transcripts. The practice of examining in
camera grand jury transcripts before releasing
for deposition purposes has fallen into disfa-
vor;82 the Supreme Court has indicated' that
77 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The case
was one of 1800 civil antitrust suits filed following
antitrust convictions of manufacturers of electrical
equipment. The procedure by which deposition
judges were to handle disclosure requests in this
litigation was upheld by several circuit courts of
appeal. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. A.B. Chance
Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963); Narin v. Clary, 312
F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1963); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
City of Ft. Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963). See
Hanley, Obtaining and Using Grand Jury Minutes in
Treble Damage Antitrust Actions, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
659 (1966), in which a practitioner reacted to the
Philadelphia case; Note, supra note 76.
7' Under the national deposition program wit-
nesses were to be deposed once for use in each of
the suits. The depositions, then, were binding on all
plaintiffs.
79 However, where the delay is partly or wholly
the fault of the petitioner for disclosure, the court
may deny access. See Baker v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492
F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974).
80 An extreme case of the deponent with a faulty
memory was presented in In re Special 1952 Grand
Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1958), where the
deponent/plaintiff could not even remember the year
in which he testified before the grand jury.
81 Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
8' [I]t is no longer necessary in every case that
the trial judge, like a fussy hen, scratch through
the grand jury transcript in camera before per-
mitting disclosure of relevant testimony therein.
Washington v. American Pipe & Construction Co.,
41 F.R.D. 59, 63-64 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
1 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855,875 (1966).
it is the function of the advocate, not the trial
judge, to determine the usefulness of evidence
to a side's cause.
Despite a unanimity of opinion in early case
law that disclosure of grand jury material for
purely discovery purposes should never be per-
mitted, s4 it is often permitted today upon a
showing of proper circumstances, reflecting a
federal policy in favor of liberal discovery. 5
Disclosure for discovery purposes is allowed
where the reasons behind the rule of grand
jury secrecy are no longer applicable to any
significant degree and/or where the party seek-
ing disclosure will be at a disadvantage if grand
jury material is not provided to him.
A group of cases granting disclosure of grand
jury materials for purely discovery purposes
has turned upon the fact that the party oppos-
ing the request had knowledge of the grand
jury proceedings. 6 Courts perceive this situa-
tion as an inequitable one that should be reme-
died. 7 Disclosure of grand jury material has
81 If a precedent is set that evidence before a
grand jury may at some future time be disclosed
to the probing examination of civil litigants in
preparation of the trial of their cause not alone
in a collateral matter but ... in dire-ctly related
matters where the inquisitorial examination of
the grand jury and a civil litigant's discovery in
preparation for trial encompass the same subject
matter ... such precedent would tend to restrict
the free function of the grand jury.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D.
486,488 (D. Del. 1954).
as See cases cited note 4 supra.
86 See, e.g., U.S. Industries v. United States District
Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965); In re Cement-
Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., [1974] TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 97,079 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958).
In Schwabe the plaintiffs counsel had worked with
the prosecution in the previous criminal trial. He,
therefore, had knowledge of the contents of the
grand jury testimony.
87 See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States
District Court, 345 F.2d at 23, where discovery of a
government sentencing memorandum containing
grand jury material was granted:
The facts in the present case lend additional
support to a liberal discovery ruling, for here
the document in question is of government ori-
gin and the party opposing disclosure has had
an opportunity to inspect its contents. It there-
fore seems highly inequitable and averse to the
principles of federal discovery to allow one party
access to a government document and not the
other. It is particularly inequitable when the
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been granted to civil plaintiffs where the de-
fendant had access to the grand jury transcript
during his criminal trial,88 where the defendant
had examined a sentencing memorandum con-
taining grand jury information at the sentenc-
ing stage of his criminal trial, 9 and where the
defendant debriefed grand jury witnesses in
preparation for trial."
A criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to any exculpatory evidence known to the
prosecution, 91 which could be contained in
grand jury transcripts. Absent a showing of
compelling reasons for nondisclosure, a crimi-
nal defendant also has the right to examine
any sentencing report prepared by the prose-
cution. 92 To condition a defendant's exercise
policy reason for denying the other party access
to the document is essentially inapplicable to the
given situation.
' In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108
(N.D. Ill. 1974), where, although use of the grand
jury transcript was limited to refreshing recollection,
impeachment and testing credibility of trial wit-
nesses, no particularized need was required to be
shown. Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., [1974]
TRAnE CAS. (CCH) 97,079 (N.D. Ill. 1974), where
the court reasoned that since the only grand jury
transcript had been physically delivered to the de-
fendants, Rule 6(e) was not applicable at all to the
plaintiffs request for discovery.
The fact that the United States, as a civil plaintiff,
has free access to grand jury materials, on the other
hand, is not a sufficient basis for granting disclosure
to the defendant. United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v. Max Factor
& Co., 39 F.R.D. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1966). The result is
justifiable in light of Rule 6(e)'s preference for disclo-
sure to United States Attorneys, i.e., only United
States Attorneys may have free disclosure without
first petitioning the court under the rule.
'9 U.S. Industries v. United States District Court,
345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965). Disclosure of a sentencing
report has been denied where only some of the
defendants had seen it at the previous criminal trial.
Hancock Bros. Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
90 Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Discovery of a debriefing
memorandum in this case raised questions of which
corporate employees could claim a corporate client/
attorney privilege as to information contained in the
memorandum, and to what extent the report repre-
sented counsel's "work product" as opposed to inves-
tigative effort. But see Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146
(E.D. Pa. 1967), where access to summaries of grand
jury testimony prepared by the defendant was denied
absent a showing of particularized need.
9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
92 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c) (3) (A) provides in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall upon
of either of these rights upon the surrender of
a claim of confidentiality of grand jury pro-
ceedings in a subsequent civil trial seems unfair,
if not unconstitutional. 93 In Hancock Bros., Inc.
v. Jones,94 the court recognized a constitution-
ally-based objection, and in denying disclosure
of a pre-sentencing memorandum to civil plain-
tiffs remarked that to allow disclosure would
be unconstitutional. The same argument, how-
ever, was made without success in Connecticut
v. General Motors Corp.9 5 The court found that
no right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings
had ever rested in the defendants. Therefore,
the exercise of any constitutional rights the
defendants may have had at their criminal trial
was not conditioned upon a release of any
other right .96 The analysis of the General Motors
request permit the defendant, or his counsel if
he is so represented, to read the report of the
presentence investigation exclusive of any rec-
ommendation as to sentence....
93 The Supreme Court has cautioned against the
conditioning of constitutional rights in a number of
situations. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(durational residency requirement for voting struck
down); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(receiving welfare benefits was conditioned upon
residing in the state a length of time); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventist
had been denied unemployment compensation un-
less she agreed to work on Saturdays). But see Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Iowa durational resi-
dency requirement for obtaining a divorce upheld).
The resolution of this line of cases would appear to
turn upon the nature of the right being conditional.
Where the right is "fundamental," a state must show
a compelling interest to justify conditioning legisla-
tion. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
0' 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
If disclosure to the defendant is used as a basis
for disclosure to the third party litigants in a
civil proceeding, the criminal defendant's access
to information via Rules 32(c) and 6(e) of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. is seriously hampered. The
defendant is thereby compelled to choose be-
tween exercising a recognized privilege or main-
taining the confidential nature of such informa-
tion. This result is undesirable as well as uncon-
stitutional in instances where the Constitution
requires giving the defendant access to such
information.
Id. at 1234.
95 [1974] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 97,079 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
96 The suggestion in the brief of Ford and Gen-
eral Motors that the disgorging by them of
Grand Jury transcripts is somehow a deprivation
of or encroachment upon the constitutional
rights of these two corporations, is to assume a
right to the continued secrecy of the testimony
of certain individuals before the Grand Jury
which no longer exists, and which never in any
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court would appear to be correct, upon exami-
nation of the traditional reasons for the policy
of grand jury secrecy. 97 It is clear that the
policy exists only for the benefit of the unin-
dicted, as opposed to the indicted accused. 9s
The constitutional objection to granting ac-
cess to grand jury materials in order to "even
up" the knowledge of the two litigants, how-
ever, is resolved if courts would permit free
disclosure of grand jury minutes to all private
litigants. This seems to be the direction courts
are taking,9 9 although Procter & Gamble has not
been overruled. First, the major premise be-
hind denying disclosure of grand jury testi-
mony in subsequent litigation, that disclosure
may deter future grand jury witnesses from
testifying freely, is tenuous. The Supreme
Court has argued that should grand jury testi-
mony be released on less than a showing of
particularized need "testimony would be parsi-
monious .... Especially is this true in antitrust
proceedings where fear of business reprisal
might haunt both the grand juror and the
witness."' 00 Nevertheless, grand jury witnesses
often expect to, and do, testify later in open
court. If the witness has testified truthfully
before the grand jury, there is no more fear of
retaliation than if disclosure were not permit-
ted. 0 1 Retaliation is not a significant consider-
event inured to the benefit of the corporate
defendants, and therefore, may not be asserted
by them.
Id. at 97,081.
'7 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
's See Bertram v. State, 33 Md. App. 115, 364 A.2d
1119 (1976), where the court stated that the rule of
secrecy exists for three groups of people: the grand
jury itself, witnesses before it, and unindicated sus-
pects.
99 While the Supreme Court has not yet author-
ized automatic disclosure in treble damage ac-
tions, the scope of discovery is normally wider in
civil litigation than in criminal prosecutions.
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D.
37, 41 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (emphasis added).
100 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 400 (1959).
1'But what are the limits of this temporary
secrecy? The answer is, on principle, that it
ceases when the grand jury has finished its duties
and has either indicted or discharged the persons
accused:
(1) If the grand jury indicts D on W's testimony,
it is plain that secrecy is no longer of any avail,
for W will be summoned as a witness at the trial
and will be compellable to testify. If he tells the
truth and the truth is the same as he testified
ation where the witness is the defendant's em-
ployee and may be coerced into "volunteering"
information to his employer anyhow.102 In the
rare case in which retaliation is feared, the
grand jury transcript may be released with
names of witnesses deleted, 0 3 or with the prov-
before the grand jury, the disclosure of the
former testimony cannot possibly bring to him
any harm (in the shape of corporal injury or
personal ill will) which his testimony on the open
trial does not equally tend to produce. If on the
other hand his testimony now is inconsistent
with that before the grand jury, the privilege
ought not to apply. The need for the evidence
in the criminal prosecution of D exceeds any
injury that would inure to the witness-grand
jury relation.
(2) If, on the contrary, the grand jury, after
hearing W's testimony, nevertheless discharges
D, there may now be a motive for W to desire
secrecy, as when on a subsequent trial it is
desired to impeach W as a witness by showing
his biased utterances against D before the grand
jury. But here the privilege ought also to cease
for another reason, namely, that the chance that
such a disclosure will be called for is too small a
contingency to have any effect a priori in render-
ing W unwilling to make complaint or give testi-
mony before the grand jury; W naturally will
have expected that D would be indicted. More-
over, when W is summoned on a civil trial
involving the same matters as the criminal charge
and it is desired to impeach him by his former
testimony, all motive for secrecy ends for the
same reasons noted in paragraph (1) supra.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
102 Grand jury witnesses may reveal their testimony
to whomever they please. Arlington Glass Co., Inc.
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ill.
1959). See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Harper & Row had
"debriefed" its employees/grand jury witnesses in
anticipation of the criminal litigation. The case illus-
trates that antitrust grand jury witnesses are not
protected by the rule of grand jury secrecy, anyway,
as long as employers can request them to "volunteer"
their testimony to them. Whatever reprisal might be
taken against antitrust employees/witnesses would
logically take place once their employers gained
knowledge of the testimony.
Where a grand jury witness/employee requests
that a transcript of his testimony be furnished to his
employer/defendant, the request is routinely granted.
See United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F. Supp.
759 (W.D. Mich. 1966); United States v. Badger
Paper Mills, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
03 U.S. Industries v. United States District Court,
345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965). The plaintiffs in this civil
antitrust suit requested and received disclosure of a
sealed government memorandum referring to grand
jury testimony.
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iso that only counsel for the discovering party
see its contents." 4 Second, there is some fear
that application of a rule of secrecy to grand
jury testimony promotes perjury.'0 5 Third,
even if testimony given to the grand jury is
incompetent or hearsay, that does not, or
should not, rule out its use for discovery leads.
Fourth, treble damage suits are permitted by
Congress to encourage private enforcement of
the antitrust laws. 10 6 The institution of these
suits would be greatly facilitated by making
grand jury materials available for discovery.
Finally, there is no fear in the case of the
individual litigant's use of grand jury materials
of abuse of the grand jury processes. The
individual litigant who profits from informa-
tion gathered by a grand jury does so through
pure chance.
DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY MATERIAL TO THE
PUBLIC
In a rare circumstance, a grand jury witness
may request that his own testimony be made
public. That request has been granted where
disclosure was in the public interest.107
Generally, however, release of grand jury
materials to the public is effected through a
grand jury report or presentment. The power
of a grand jury to make a presentment is
recognized in the Constitution.0 " Strictly
speaking, a grand jury "presentment" is an
accusation of crime, comparable to an unsigned
indictment, while a "report" makes no such
accusation. 0 9 While a federal grand jury clearly
104 United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F. Supp.
759 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
'15 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 19
F.R.D. 122, 126 (D.N.J. 1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 677
(1958); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
106 Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1133 (1974).
107 In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973). Mr.
Biaggi, a Congressman, sought disclosure of his
testimony after newspapers reported that he had
exercised his fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination 30 times. Although there was no judicial
proceeding with which the disclosure could be con-
nected, the court released the testimony under the
theory that all those possibly benefiting from the
rule of secrecy-the witness and the Government-
had waived it.
108 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
109 Application of United Electrical, Radio & Ma-
chine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 863 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
has the power to make a presentment or report,
the district court must decide what degree of
disclosure, if any, will be made of it."1 A fairly
recent opinion concluded that "the court
should regulate the amount of disclosure, to
be sure that it is no greater than required by
the public 'interest in knowing' when weighed
against the rights of the persons mentioned in
the presentment.""'
There is a discernible trend in the federal
courts toward permitting disclosure of grand
jury reports. Where the grand jury had desired
to present an indictment, but the United States
Attorney has refused to sign it, disclosure of a
presentment would seem to be in order.1
2
Substantial publicity concerning the nature of
a grand jury report has resulted in release of
this report."'
On the other hand federal grand jury reports
may be expunged if they deal with matters
outside the grand jury's concern, i.e., the en-
forcement of federal statutes." 4 A report com-
menting upon the sufficiency of evidence
against an indicted defendant also must be
expunged, as violative of his right to a fair trial
before an unprejudiced body of peers." 5
Grand jury reports may request disclosure to
a specific administrative,"0  or legislative
17
body, rather than to the public. Such reports
are generally justified as the expression of
"'In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp.
662 (D. Md. 1970).
' Id. at 678.
112 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 196 (5th
Cir.), (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965); In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F.
Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970).
An indictment unsigned by a Justice Department
official cannot be a true bill; nor can a court order
that an indictment be signed. United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d at 172.
"I Application of Johnson, 484 F.2d 791 (7th Cir.
1973); In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp.
662 (D. Md. 1970).
14 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458
(5th Cir. 1973). A grand jury report criticizing a state
prosecutor's handling of a criminal trial was ex-
punged of all local references.
"I Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D.
Ohio), affd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971). The ac-
cuseds, participants in the Kent State tragedy,
brought a successful suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deprivation of their civil rights to due process by the
issuance of the grand jury report.
116 See Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.
1958).
"' See In re Report & Recommendation of June 5,
1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
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concerned citizens. Where a grand jury report
recommended subMitting material to an appro-
priate governmental body, and the disclosure
was in the public interest, it was permitted.
118
However, where a report drew conclusions and
appeared to direct a governmental agency to
take certain action, the court refused to issue
it, citing a separation of powers problem.liS
Upon examining the grand jury report in
light of the traditional reasons for secrecy, it is
apparent that disclosure should be tightly reg-
ulated. There remains a great deal of debate
concerning the fairness of the grand jury pre-
sentment or report. Although proponents argue
that the public has a right to know about
conduct falling just within the bounds of legal-
ity,1 20 detractors view reports as possibly un-
founded accusations of misconduct in which




8 Id. This case concerned a report prepared by
the Watergate grand jury on the possible involvement
of President Nixon, an unindicted co-conspirator.
The grand jury report recommended that material
be transmitted to the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives.
"9 Application of United Electrical, Radio & Ma-
chine Workers, II1 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The report recommended that the NLRB revoke
certification of some unions whose representatives
had invoked the fifth amendment while testifying
before the grand jury. The court saw a clear violation
of the separation of powers principle, classifying the
grand jury as an arm of the judiciary. Contra, United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1965)
(Rives, J., dissenting). However, the opinion can also
be perceived as a reaction to an attempt by a grand
jury to deprive the petitioners of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
120 Thus grand jury presentments of public af-
fairs serve a need that is not met by any other
procedure. The grand jury provides a readily
available group of representative citizens of the
county empowered, as occasion may demand, to
voice the conscience of the community. There
are many official acts and omissions that fall
short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in
the public interest. It is very much to the public
advantage that such conduct be revealed in an
effective, official way. No community desires to
live a hairbreadth above the criminal level, which
might well be the case if there were no official
organ of public protest. Such presentments are
a great deterrent to official wrongdoing. By
exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such present-
ments inspire public confidence in the capacity
of the body politic to purge itself of untoward
conditions.
In re Presentment by Camden Grand Jury, 10 NJ.
23, 66, 89 A.2d 416, 443-44 (1952).
121 See In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence,
184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960).
A grand jury report concerning an innocent
person may cause that person unnecessary em-
barassment. In addition, grand jury witnesses
may be reluctant to testify freely if it becomes a
common practice to expose the witness' testi-
mony to public scrutiny. These objections,
however, may be overcome where the grand
jury investigation has received such publicity
that only disclosure of the true nature of the
proceedings can combat rumors. If the public-
ity is accurate, disclosure can do no more harm
than has already occurred. If the publicity is
inaccurate, disclosure of the true nature of a
grand jury report could protect innocent per-
sons.
CONCLUSION
The rule of secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings has at its roots a concern that the grand
jury system be permitted to function as an
independent institution empowered to investi-
gate crimes. In order to function thus, grand
jurors must be free to act on their own, inde-
pendent of control by court, prosecutor or any
civil agency. Grand jury witnesses must be free
to testify without fear of reprisal. Ii determin-
ing motions for disclosure of grand jury mate-
rials under Rule 6(e), courts should emphasize
the reasons behind the rule. The standard of
"particularized need" should not be routinely
applied to every request for disclosure. The
perceived dangers of revealing grand jury ma-
terials vary from case to case. In particular,
there is great variation among the four types
of parties seeking access: state prosecutor, ad-
ministrative agency, civil litigant or the public;
each category presents its own threats to the
grand jury system. The grand jury report cases
are a commendable example of the value of a
case by case analysis, unhampered by a "parti-
cularized need" requirement. The trial judge
balances the public's "right to know" against
any perceivable harm to a grand jury suspect
or witness. The rule of grand jury secrecy in
this way truly relates to its purposes. On the
other hand, the cases determining access of
official, administrative and private civil litigants
to grand jury materials often show a preoccu-
pation with the particularized need standard
with little consideration of the real benefits or
dangers of the disclosure requested.
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